INTRODUCTION
A longstanding debate in the strategy and entrepreneurship literatures is whether or not a formal written business plan helps the nascent founder to achieve venture viability (Bhide, 2000; Delmar and Shane, 2003; Honig and Samuelsson, 2014; Delmar, 2015) . Formal planshere defined as written scripts that detail markets to be served, proposed products/services, required resources, and the anticipated growth and profitability of the new venture (Stevenson and Van Slyke, 1985) -are central to this debate. Some scholars argue that written plans provide a rational synopsis of the steps necessary to develop a viable venture (Delmar and Shane, 2003) . Other scholars, however, argue that formal plans add little value, and that founders are better off without a formal plan (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Carter, Gartner and Reynolds, 1996; Lange et al., 2007) . Given that the extant literature remains oppositional, the empirical evidence on the efficacy of formal plans has also remained contradictory, making it difficult to substantiate if plans help nascent founders to achieve venture viability.
In this study, we argue that a principal reason for these gaps is that few studies have taken account of what prompts a founder to plan formally (selection effects). Selection effects are important because the founder's prior education and experience, the type of venture they are seeking to create, and differences in the environment they face are likely to impact both on the likelihood of formal planning and on the chances of achieving venture viability.
Indeed, conflating selection and performance effects leads to biased estimates of the planperformance relationship (Burke, Fraser and Greene, 2010) . This paper's primary contribution is to develop and test a counterfactual model that explicitly isolates selection effects from the plan-viability relationship. To do so, we focus on key founder, venture, and environmental antecedents that affect the decision to formally plan.
We focus on the founder's educational attainment and prior sectoral and entrepreneurial experience because they are important determinants of both plan and venture outcomes (Dencker, Gruber and Shah, 2009a; Burke et al., 2010) . Similarly, we examine venture characteristics such as innovation, growth orientation, product complexity, the competitive nature of the external environment, and the need for external finance because, again, they are key determinants of the choice to plan (Kim, Longest, Lippman, 2015; Honig and Karlsson, 2004) . Finally, we focus on venture viability because, as McMullen and Dimov (2013) suggest, it is the conclusion of the nascent phase of the 'entrepreneurial journey'.
To investigate our model, we use propensity score matching. This allows us to 'net out' selection effects, thereby reducing 'the problem of unfair comparison' (Li, 2013: 214) .
Subsequently, we isolate the impact of the plan on venture viability. This is a novel contribution because we estimate what would have happened if the planning founder had instead decided not to plan. Modelling this counterfactual state is important because, as Chwolka and Raith (2012) point out, key to understanding the value of a plan is to comprehend what is not chosen, rather than just measuring what turns out to be chosen.
Empirically, we use Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED II) data on 1,088 nascent founders. These data allow us to address issues of reverse causality and draw stronger causal inferences about the plan-viability relationship. In summary, the key advantage of our approach -for both plan advocates and skeptics -is that we take explicit account of selection biases, develop a counterfactual model that separates out plan selection from performance effects, and use large-scale longitudinal data to assess if founders who write a plan are more likely to achieve new venture viability.
Our key results are twofold. First, selection effects matter: better educated individuals, those seeking finance, innovators, and those with complex products/services are more likely to plan. Second, it pays to plan: founders that formally plan are more likely to achieve venture viability. These findings contribute to resolving the ongoing debate about the value of formal plans. Such findings are also of practical importance. Despite improvisational logics such as effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001) , bricolage (Baker and Nelson, 2005) and lean start up (Ries, 2011) being increasingly taught in our universities and being promoted as more reliable mechanisms for founders to achieve venture viability, our results suggest that the writing of formal plans is a useful way for actually helping founders and students orchestrate their fledgling business propositions. Moreover, our findings have importance to financiers who use plans to help allocate start-up finance, and the millions of nascent founders that choose to write a formal plan (Gumpert, 2002) .
In the next section, we review the extant business plan literature. Subsequently, we develop our hypotheses, explain our methodology, and detail our results. We conclude by reflecting on the implications for both theory and practice.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we review the strategy and entrepreneurship literatures on formal written plans. The strategy literature from early conceptual and empirical studies (Thune and House, 1970) through to more recent studies (Greenley, 1994; Andersen, 2004; Rudd et al., 2008; Wolf and Floyd, 2013) has focused on if plans aid performance of large firms. By comparison, relatively few entrepreneurship studies have examined the plan-performance relationship for emerging ventures (Gruber, 2007; Dencker et al., 2009a) . Both research streams agree, however, that the experiences of the planner and the context in which they write a plan are important in shaping the plan-performance relationship (Wolf and Floyd, 2013; Brinkmann et al., 2010) .
Formal plans in strategy research
In the strategy literature, the impact of a plan on performance has been marked by a theoretical divide between those that champion an improvisational and emergent approach (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) and those that see the merits of formal rational plans (Ansoff, 1991) . The rationalist synoptic paradigm posits that plans are intrinsic to the development of systematic goals and concrete steps that allow the business to effectively co-ordinate and integrate activities (Miller and Cardinal, 1994; Latham, 1990, 2002; Wolf and Floyd, 2013) . Plans aid the development of a framework for adaptive thinking (Ansoff, 1991; Anderson, 2004) -even when uncertainty is high (Armstrong, 1982) -and help anticipate the timing of resource flows and ease impediments in the matching of resource supply and demand. Further, plans help managers to build confidence in their actions; to communicate goals, strategies and operational tasks; and to build traction, both internally and externally, for their plans (Falshaw et al., 2006) . Finally, plans provide opportunities to improve decision making prior to investing resources, both in terms of identifying missing information and examining the implicit assumptions inherent in the business (Boyd, 1991) .
In contrast, researchers from the improvisational paradigm have emphasized that plans introduce rigidities which can impede innovation and lead to excessive bureaucracy (Bresser and Bishop, 1983; Miller and Cardinal, 1994) . Consequently, plans may retard the speed of decision making, bias decision making towards the status quo, and mistake strategic programming for strategic thinking (Mintzberg, 1994) .
Successive empirical reviews of formal planning, however, have produced equivocal findings which, at best, show a weakly positive plan-performance relationship (Armstrong, 1982; Pearce et al., 1987; Boyd, 1991; Schwenk and Shrader, 1993; Miller and Cardinal, 1994; Greenley, 1994; Rue and Ibrahim, 1998; Brews and Hunt, 1999; Grant, 2003) .
Formal plans in entrepreneurship research
Although the theoretical debate evident above is also present in the entrepreneurship literature, what is axiomatically different about entrepreneurial ventures is that they are not scaled down versions of large firms (Robinson and Pearce, 1984; Storey and Greene, 2010) .
Illustrative of this is that, on average, the founder has greater latitude about how they translate their vision for their business into reality. Consequently, a founder's education and experiences inform how founders devise and execute the strategy for their business.
However, in envisioning their new venture, founders are also faced with a dynamic and uncertain task environment which can complicate decision making about, among other things, operations, competitive positioning and venture financing.
The presence of heightened uncertainty, though, has not lessened the debate about the efficacy of formal plans. Plan proponents such as Delmar and Shane (2003) argue that plans are a tool for delineating goals and actions necessary for launching a venture. A plan can also spur on start-up motivations and promote self-efficacy (Krueger and Brazeal, 1994; Bandura, 1997) , thereby reinforcing goal commitment and persistence (Liao and Gartner, 2006) . Plans may also promote adaptive thinking and learning about how to achieve age-old questions such as 'where is the business now'; 'where does it want to be'; and 'how is it going to get there' (Ansoff, 1991; Miller and Cardinal, 1994) . Indeed, as a boundary-spanning device, plans may help the founder to select, evaluate and fine-tune nascent activities and, in the process, reduce mistakes and help avoid hazards that derail the nascent venture (Delmar and Shane, 2003) . Moreover, plans may play an important communicative role in convincing (potential) employees of the founder's strategic intent and building legitimacy with outside financiers. If so, plans may help overcome liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) , and aid in leveraging external finance (Honig and Karlsson, 2004) .
In contrast, plan critics have provided a number of reasons why plans are not beneficial. Honig and Karlsson (2004) argue that outside of building legitimacy with external funders, plans offer little intrinsic value to the founder in directing their activities: plans are a ceremonial device that diverts founders away from significant organizational tasks (Kirsch, Goldfarb and Gera, 2009) . Echoing this are studies which emphasize that founders are better off enacting nascent activities than writing a plan (Carter et al., 1996; Lange et al., 2007) .
This may be because some business concepts do not require a plan: they are either really simple to execute without a plan or, if they are more elaborate, the written plan may bear little relation to the actual progress of the venture (Carter et al., 1996; Lange et al., 2007) , particularly when product/service adaptations are common, distribution channels opaque, and market needs ill-defined (Drucker, 1985; Andries and Debackere, 2007) . Plans also sit uneasily with Schumpeterian notions of the entrepreneur (Bhide, 2000) . They may involve incremental adjustments and conformity, whereas some founders may seek to develop radical and innovative solutions to problems. Besides stifling improvisation and constraining flexibility, plans may further provide pseudo-exact estimates that enhance a false illusion of control (Dencker et al., 2009a) .
The identification of the potential benefits and costs of plans has not led, however, to the empirical resolution of whether writing a formal plan facilitates better performance. Prior results have reflected the oppositional nature of the extant debate: some studies find that formal plans lead to performance benefits (Lumpkin et al., 1998; Perry, 2001; Delmar and Shane, 2003, 2004; Gibson and Cassar, 2005; Gruber, 2007) ; while others point to the costs of such plans (Robinson and Pearce, 1984; Bhide, 2000; Allinson et al., 2000; Lange et al., 2007; Honig and Karlsson, 2004; Karlsson and Honig, 2009; Dencker et al., 2009a) .
Preliminary conclusions and implications for this study
Our review reveals that the business plan literature, and the consequent empirical evidence, remains conflicting and oppositional. This reflects an assumption that the characteristics of planners and their emerging venture differ little from those that elect not to plan. However, this neglects that founders are heterogeneous in their background experiences and education and that the characteristics of the fledgling venture are likely to shape the decision to plan. A central motivation for our study, therefore, is that this lack of focus on who writes a plan and under what circumstances it is written (selection effects) stymies the comprehension of plan effects on performance. Hence, prior to the assessment of plan-performance effects, it is important to isolate heterogeneity in the decision to plan. Accordingly, drawing on the extant evidence, we first develop arguments about how important founder, venture and environmental antecedents affect the decision to write a plan. Subsequently, we examine the impact that a plan has on the likelihood of achieving venture viability.
HYPOTHESES

The effects of founder characteristics on the decision to plan
Our first argument is that better educated founders are more likely to write a plan. This reflects that the better educated are more likely to recognize that a plan provides learning benefits (Dencker et al., 2009a) . Consequently, these founders may be more likely to perceive that a plan can detect and identify patterns and allow for meaningful conclusions to be drawn. They may be also more comfortable with scanning the external environment to identify external knowledge, have greater levels of absorptive capacity, and be better able to transform new knowledge into actions (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) . Moreover, they may be socialized by higher levels of education into thinking that a plan is important and relevant (Honig, 2004) . Hence, while the better educated may navigate the vicissitudes of nascent venturing without a plan (Burke et al., 2010) , our contention is that the better educated are more comfortable with collating, coordinating and analyzing the information involved in writing a plan (Robinson and Pearce, 1984) , and are more likely to envisage that a plan aids task comprehension and guides the identification of the customer/supplier requirements (Dencker et al., 2009a) . Hence, we argue that:
H1a: Better educated founders are more likely to formally plan
In general, studies show that prior sectoral and entrepreneurial experience provides tacit knowledge on markets and valuable start-up task comprehension (Haynie et al., 2009; Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Shane, 2003) . We see that such experiences are likely to lower the propensity of such founders to write a plan. Prior repetition of nascent venturing aids tacit start-up and industry comprehension (Cassar, 2014; Dimov, 2010) , increasing the prospect that those with repositories of pre-entry experience know what questions to ask and how to interpret the findings to derive appropriate actions without having to plan (Baron and Ensley, 2006) . Further, although experienced founders may recognize that each business opportunity is idiosyncratic (Frankish et al., 2012) , they may believe that there are few upsides from writing a plan (Dencker et al., 2009a) , particularly as it is both difficult and costly to collect information for a plan (Cooper et al., 1995) . Hence, we argue that: Other key determinants of the decision to plan are the internal task environment conditions (Ensley, Carland and Carland, 2003) . In settings in which the product/service is complex, there are heightened expectations of growth, and the venture provides innovation in the marketplace, we argue that founders are more likely to write a formal plan. Armstrong (1982) finds that a plan is actually most likely to be beneficial when the challenges facing the venture are high. Plans help resolve organizational conflicts and provide a vision for how to review strategic options, thus reducing the chances of mistakes or wasteful activities (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995) . A plan may also distinguish between transient and intransient challenges (Glick, Miller and Huber, 1993) , and prompt a careful review of internal factors (Miller and Cardinal, 1994) . Evaluating progress against key targets is particularly important when faced with crucial decisions such as the deployment of capital equipment (Grinyer et al., 1986) or the opportune time for employing staff (Dencker et al., 2009b) . Miller and Cardinal (1994) suggest that these decisions should be planned rather than left to chance, particularly if the aspiration is to grow the venture. Indeed, Bhide (2000) suggests that if the estimated potential market is large, there may be a greater justification for a plan since it helps co-ordinate resource flows necessary for achieving growth, and helps identify new directions and opportunities (Moorman and Miner, 1997) . Consequently, although in growth, innovative and complex task settings the assumption to knowledge ratio is higher (Gruber, 2007) , we contend that plans clarify the opportunity, set out the means by which ends can be achieved, and help co-ordinate nascent activities. Hence, we suggest that: Although competitor actions and motivations can be difficult to discern if information is costly and difficult to find (Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989) , we also argue that planning is more likely to occur when the competitive environment (i.e. the factors beyond the control of the founder (Shrader et al., 1984) ) is more rivalrous. In an environment where competition is intense, we see that writing a plan is more likely because it promotes a comprehension of the salience of competitive pressures, the importance of not being caught off guard by competitors and, crucially, plays a role in identifying the market entry strategy to compete effectively with existing incumbents. Hence, plans may provide competitor information that allows founders to predict competitor actions. Therefore, we suggest that:
H3a: Founders faced with a heightened competitive environment are more likely to formally plan
Studies also indicate that founders seeking external finance often write plans because they recognize that outside financiers use plans to estimate and value their nascent venture. For example, Kuratko and Hodgetts (2001: 289) state 'the business plan is the minimum document required by any financial source'. This is supported by Honig and Karlsson (2004) .
Their research demonstrates that there is a shared expectation among both founders and external financiers that writing a formal plan is a pre-requisite for gaining external funding. A formal plan is seen is likely to stimulate such funding because it serves as an legitimation device that demonstrates to external audiences that the nascent venture will overcome its liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and go on to achieve viability. Consequently, we argue that:
H3b: Founders seeking external finance are more likely to formally plan The impact of plans on achieving new venture viability
Central to our approach is that the principal reason why there is conflicting evidence about the efficacy of plans is that prior studies have conflated selection with performance effects. Burke et al., (2010) is one of the few studies to isolate the plan-performance relationship:
they show that formal plans helped existing small firms to grow. However, no prior studies disentangle plan selection and performance effects in a nascent venture setting. There are also conflicting theoretical accounts of the plan-performance relationship. Improvisationalist based accounts of formal plans tend to argue that plans are a way of 'settting oneself on a predetermined course in unknown waters is the perfect way to sail straight into an iceberg' (Mintzberg, 1987: 26) while plan proponents argue that the only way to avoid the iceberg is to have a map (Matthews and Scott, 1995; Zollo and Winter, 2002) . Chandler et al., (2011: 376) has suggested that these differences have led to 'a dichotomous war between the need to 'develop a full-blown business and marketing plan' and the need to 'just get started''. Faced with conflicting theoretical claims and divergent empirical evidence, for our final crucial argument we consequently use a competing hypothesis approach. This is valuable since 'testing competing hypotheses is an effective way to determine the relative merits of alternative theories' (Miller and Tsang, 2011: 114) , particularly 'where prior knowledge leads to two or more reasonable explanations' (Armstrong, Brodie and Parsons, 2001: 4) . Hence, we contrast rational and improvisational approaches. Improvisational orientated approaches suggest that there are often no benefits to a plan, only costs (Lange et al., 2007) . By not formally planning, it allows founders to focus on leveraging their strategic resources to embrace contingencies (Bhide, 2000; Sarasvathy, 2001; Fisher, 2012) and, by enacting rather than evaluating the opportunity, it promotes the chances of achieving new venture viability.
In contrast, rationalist purposive plan scholars appear to admit no costs to plans, only benefits. This reflects three key advantages: 1) that a plan is a boundary spanning goal statement that equips founders with an understanding of required activities and resources (Delmar and Shane, 2003) ; 2) that plans promote goal attainment, particularly in 'stretch' environments such as nascent venturing, because goal setting directs attention, energizes individuals and promotes task persistence (Locke and Latham, 2002) ; and 3) plans enhance reflective and active learning (Chwolka and Raith, 2012) . Hence, like other studies faced with two competing but viable alternatives (Goerzen, 2007; Ebben and Johnson, 2005) , we suggest the following: we truncated the sample to founders whose gestation activities began 10 years prior to Wave A, reasoning that those who spent more than 10 years on a new venture are unlikely to be serious about venture creation (Mueller, 2006) . This reduced our sample from 1,214 to 1,106, for which we have missing data for 18 observations (i.e. the total sample is 1,088). Second, and similar again to Yang and Aldrich (2012), we controlled for the time that founders had spent on gestation activities prior to Wave A. Following on from the list of gestation activities identified by Reynolds (2011: 36) , we took the earliest activity undertaken as the starting point of the organizing sequence and calculated the time span (in months) until the interview date (See Appendix for details of all variables used in this study).
H4a (Improvisationalist): There is a negative relationship between formal plans and achieving venture viability H4b (Purposive Planning): There is a positive relationship between formal plans and achieving venture viability
METHODS
Data
Analysis
Aguinis and Edwards (2013) argue that three conditions need to be satisfied before appropriate causal inferences can be drawn from an analysis: 1) an association between cause and effect; 2) that cause precedes effect; and 3) that alternative explanations for the causal effect are ruled out. If cause differs from effect, this satisfies condition 1. Condition 2 can be controlled for by using longitudinal samples such as ours which avoid issues of reverse causality since the decision to plan, like our measures of founder, internal and environmental factors, precede venture viability. Condition 3, however, is trickier: in order to arrive at the effect of a treatment (the business plan) on an outcome (venture viability), two groups must be created -one that gets the treatment and one that is the control group -that are as similar as possible 1 . For example, suppose genetically identical twins each seek to set up a new business, with one deciding to plan (treatment group) and the other choosing not to plan (control group). Subsequently, we observe that the planning twin achieves new venture viability while the other twin disbands their venture. Since these twins are identical, it is plausible that viability is due to the treatment effect (the business plan). However, the challenge often, particularly in observational data such as ours, is to create 'statistical twins' that are matched in terms of their observable characteristics. This is important because if the treatment and control groups do not resemble each other, it is likely that the relationship between a treatment and an outcome will be mis-specified, since it is difficult to disentangle whether the impact on an outcome (venture viability) is due to the treatment effect (the plan) or selection effects.
One established way of creating a treatment group alongside a counterfactual control group using data such as ours is to use propensity score matching (Li, 2013; Kaiser and Malchow-Møller, 2011; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . The logic of this approach is to match the characteristics of a treatment group (planners) with a control group (non-planners) so that their characteristics are observationally equivalent except for one crucial difference: one group decides to plan and the other group decides not to. Subsequently, if a planner achieves venture viability, this can be attributed to the treatment effect (the plan) rather than their characteristics (selection effects). In using propensity score matching, we follow Li (2013) and adopt his four-stage protocol.
The first stage involves an assessment of endogeneity. Hence, 'before matching' we assess if there are systematic differences between the treatment and control groups in terms of differences in founder, venture and external characteristics that may impact both on the decision to plan and, subsequently, on the chances of achieving venture viability (see Table   2 ). If endogeneity exists, unadjusted results will be biased and lead to facile inferences (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003) . This justifies using the estimation of the propensity score (i.e. the conditional probability of receiving the treatment (formal plan)). The second stage involves assessing the quality of this matching to identify unresolved sources of endogeneity.
Hence, there is a need, 'after matching', to see if differences in the mean values of individual and venture characteristics persist or are successfully removed through matching (Table 3) .
Conditional on the matching being balanced such that the treatment and control groups are 'statistical twins', the third step is to analyze treatment effects by estimating the causality between the treatment effect (the plan) and the outcome (venture viability) (Leuven and Sianesi, 2014) . These estimates, conditional on the propensity score, are the sample Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATTs). These ATTs are the average effects from the treatment (formal plans) for those who actually were treated (planners). The ATTs answer the question: what would have happened if the planner had decided not to write a formal plan?
The fourth and final stage is to conduct sensitivity analyses. These are vital because estimates of, in our case, plan effects on venture viability, are sensitive to the use of predictor variables and matching estimators. Li (2013) advocates calculating the sensitivity of the sample ATT estimates to the matching algorithms used and examining the existence of potential distortions by unobserved variables. This is what we do: we provide sample ATT estimates based on different distributional assumptions (Table 4) , dependent variable characterizations (Table 5) , matching techniques (Table 6) , control group compositions (Table 7) and use Rosenbaum bounds to test for potential unobserved heterogeneity (Table   8 ). We also provide population Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) estimates (i.e. the expected effects from a randomly selected unit of the population). Population ATEs are important because there are those in the wider population who do not formally plan because, for example, they may be simply unaware of the option to plan. Examining population ATEs allows us to assess for the presence of unobservable heterogeneity and provides further wider external, population based, validity for our sample ATTs. To achieve this, we compare our estimates for the ATT and ATE and test if there are material differences between the matched sample and the non-matched units 2 .
Overall, propensity score matching means that we can estimate the probability of formally planning conditional on matched characteristics. Besides being robust, propensity score matching does not rely upon instruments that are difficult to find (i.e. a variable that is related to writing a plan but not performance) and explicitly allows for covariate imbalance adjustments between non/formal planners. Matching is also advantageous because rather than focusing on one mediator, it controls for a set of variables at the same time. This is important because there a number of factors that are likely to simultaneously influence the decision and utility of a plan. Hence, by focusing on the predicted probability of formal plans, we can derive the counterfactual based on several theoretical antecedents simultaneously (Kaiser and Malchow-Møller, 2011; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) 3 .
Dependent Variable: Venture Viability
McMullen and Dimov (2013 Dimov ( : 1496 theorize that 'the entrepreneurial journey concludes for the firm once that venture definitively realizes a profit or loss from activities related to that product'. Hence, as with Kim et al. (2015) and Yang and Aldrich (2012), we use: 'when monthly revenues exceed monthly expenses for six out of 12 months; including salaries for the managers' (PSED II: A35) as our dependent variable (1=if the monthly revenues exceed monthly expenses for six out of 12 months; including salaries for the managers; 0=otherwise). In our main analysis, we report ongoing activities as per wave F and compare founders that achieved venture viability (A35) against those that disband their venture (A42, E51: 1=founders stop their venture activities and no-one else is working on the venture, 0=otherwise) and those that are 'still trying' to prosecute their venture (Davidsson and Gordon, 2012; Dimov, 2010) . To complement this binary variable (venture viability vs. disbandment/still trying), in our robustness tests, we use three alternative dependent variables: 1) the founder's self-reported assessment of achieving venture viability (A41:
1=self-report venture viability, 0=otherwise); 2) sustained viability (A35 and no venture disbandment (A42) until wave F); and 3) achieved first sale (E14: 1=First revenue has been received from the sale of goods or services for this new business; 0=otherwise). We also extend this binary dependent variable by testing multinomial models (Table 4 , row 4; Table   5 , rows 3 and 6) which, following on from Davidsson and Gordon (2012) , assess the relationship between formal plans and three outcomes -viability (A35), disbandment (A42, E51), and 'still trying'.
Formal planners
As with other studies, our focus is on formal written plans (Delmar and Shane, 2003; Lange et al., 2007) . To identify formal planners, we used two PSED II questions (D1 and D2:
1=formal planners, 0=otherwise) 4 . Table 1 show that the treatment group consists of 269 (24 percent) founders 5 . The control group is made up of the remaining 819 founders 6 . To test whether the composition of the control group makes any difference to the plan-performance relationship, Table 7 provides robustness tests of alternative control group compositions.
Predictor covariates: Individual founder, venture characteristics and environmental factors
4 The corresponding PSED question defines the business plan for the respondents as 'A business plan usually outlines the markets to be served, the products or services to be provided, the resources required --including money --and the expected growth and profit for the new business." Given the inherent difficulties in assessing the quality of the plan with this measure, we corroborated whether or not nascents had completed other activities usually related to business planning, such as financial planning (Burke et al., 2009) , marketing (Gruber, 2007) or general prediction activities (Sarasvathy, 2001) . Those that formally plan are also more likely to do financial projections (ß=0.27, p<0.01), engage in marketing activities (ß=0.12, p<0.05), define their market opportunity (ß=0.114, p<0.05) and collect information about competitors (ß=0.088, p<0.1). 5 Studies by Pearce et al., (1987) , Bhide (2000) , Sarasvathy (2001) and Burke et al., (2010) also show that formal planners are in the minority. 6 In particular, the group consist of different types of non-formal planners based on the planning status reported up to and including wave F: 385 'informal' planners; 159 'unwritten' and 'in their head' planners; 224 that consider the plan irrelevant; and 51 that considered a plan as relevant but never complete any plan activities up to and including wave F. See Appendix for further information.
In terms of founder characteristics, we follow Davidsson and Honig (2003) and Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) and measure educational attainment in terms of years of schooling (H6); number of years of sectoral experience in the same industry as the venture (H11); and entrepreneurial experience with other ventures (H13). To assess the innovativeness of the venture, we follow Dahlqvist and Wiklund (2012) and assess innovation by using a three point scale (S1: 3=all, 2=some, 1=no customers ...are unfamiliar with the new product/service). We follow Kim et al. (2015) to assess the expectations about venture growth (T1:1='I want this new business to be as large as possible', 0=otherwise) and to examine product/service complexity through a composite measure of the level of novelty and technical expertise required to compete successfully (F4, F5, F8-10; scales inverted;
Cronbach's alpha of 0.72). To measure the need for external finance, we use a binary measure: if founders were actually seeking financial capital (E2: 1=yes; 0=otherwise) (Reynolds, 2011) and assess competitive pressures by using S2 (3=there are many; 2=there are some; 1=there are no ...other businesses offering the same product/service).
Control variables
We control for a wide range of other variables that may influence the decision to plan: to complement the need for external finance, we assess the amount of personal resources used in the venture (Q4-Q10: total dollar amount invested of personal savings and other sources); time spent on the nascent venture (H16:1=35 hours or greater; 0=otherwise), team size (AG2: number of founders: Colombo and Grilli, 2005) , the founder's ability expectations (Q.AY4-AY8; scales inverted so that higher values indicate higher levels of ability expectations;
Cronbach's alpha: 0.68; Townsend, Busenitz, and Arthurs, 2010); and their start up commitment (AY9 and AY10; inverted scales; Cronbach's alpha: 0.71; Dimov, 2010) . We also control for work experience (H20: years), the time elapsed between the first gestation activity and Wave A (Yang and Aldrich, 2012) , and sector (B1: dummies of service, retail and other industries (base category)).
RESULTS
We organize our results in eight tables. Table 1 presents summary statistics and correlations. (Reynolds, 2011; Spletzer et al, 2004 ). Table 2 provide useful information, we focus our tests of H1a-H3b on the probit regression results (dependent variable: non/formal planners) reported in Column 3. The additional probit regression reported in Column 4 is used to ascertain if founder and venture antecedents also impact on venture viability. In sum, the aim of Table 2 is to assess if there are selection effects in the decision to plan (Column 3) and if these are endogenous to the achievement of venture viability (Column 4).
Column 3 of (product/service complexity) or for H3a (competitive pressures). However, we find strong support for H3b (ß=0.194; p<0.01) (external finance). This is the largest coefficient in Table   2 , indicating that founders seeking finance are 19 percentage points more likely to plan. The need for external finance is also related positively to venture viability (Column 4). Table 2 also identifies that founders with greater levels of private savings are less likely to plan but those who have bigger teams and spend more time on their venture are more likely to plan. In summary, in terms of our hypothesized relationships, Column 3 shows that the better educated, innovators, and those seeking finance and growth were more likely to formally plan. In contrast, sectoral and entrepreneurial experience, competition and product complexity all appear to have no discernible impact on plan propensity. Column 4 shows that education, sectoral experience, and the need for external finance influence the venture viability prospects, indicating clear evidence of a strong and severe endogeneity problem obfuscating the causal effect of plans on venture viability. Table 2 around here please
Because of this endogeneity, we conducted propensity score matching to level out differences between the treatment and control groups. Table 3 reports the subsequent 'after matching' results in terms of mean (t-test results) (Column 1) and distributional (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) (Column 2) differences. These reveal that there are no differences in the core mean values for either planners or non-planners (i.e. differences have been levelled out). 7 Moreover, the p-values in Column 2 (p>0.1) show that the distributional overlap has been achieved through matching. Crucially, however, the differences in venture viability/disbandment probabilities are still significant (ß=0.161, p<0.01) 8 . Table 3 around here please
We now turn to the impact of formal plans on new venture viability. Table 4 presents the sample ATT results. We present four variants of these results. First, we present results from the propensity score (Psmatch2): formal planners are more likely to achieve viability (ß=0.160, p<0.01). To check whether this result is biased by model uncertainty (due to differential distributions in our propensity score matching), we also report a linear probability model (row 2) and a probit model (row 3) allowing for non-linear effects in the distribution of variables: coefficients for these models are slightly higher but remain significant (ß=0.193, p<0.01 and ß=0.194, p<0.01, respectively) . Finally, row 4 shows the results for a multinomial probit comparing three outcomes (venture viability/disbandment/still trying): these again are significant (ß=0.206, p<0.01). These results support H4b. Table 4 around here please
Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of these results, Table 5 provides ATT results for three alternative dependent variables: self-reported venture viability (rows 1-3); sustained viability (rows 4-6); 7 Whenever differences in mean values existed after propensity score matching the cem-procedure suggested in Iacus, King, and Porro (2011) has been applied to this variable to level out differences . 8 This is not due to differences in the general distribution of predictor variables. The p -values from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are insignificant after matching for any predictor variable. However, the distributional difference remains for venture viability. This is important as it represents our dependent variable. We also conducted a sub-sample analysis according to the propensity blocks (psmatch procedure). Only two variables are significant at the 5 per cent level (i.e. 2 out of 68 models (3 percent), which is expected at the 5 per cent level) and only one variable was significant at the 1 per cent level (i.e. 1 out of 68 models (1.4 percent), which again is expected at the 1 per cent level).
and achievement of first sale (rows 7-9). Again, as with Table 4 , we report Psmatch2, probit and multinomial model results. Although the plan-achieving first sale relationship is much weaker, Table 5 confirms that formal planners are more likely to achieve both self-assessed Another source of potential bias may be due to the matching method employed.
Following Li (2013) , Table 6 provides estimates from nearest neighbor, kernel and radius matching. For nearest neighbor, we compute the ATTs using only one single neighbor to provide a more conservative estimate (more matching partners increase a potential bias: Abadie et al., 2004) . For radius matching, controls are matched to treated units when the propensity score falls into a pre-defined range of the treated unit (Huber et al., 2012) . Finally, to provide non-parametric ATTs, we use kernel matching (all treated units are matched with a weighted average of the controls: Becker and Ichino, 2002) . We also analyzed whether control group composition affects our results. Table 7 shows that formal planners are more likely to achieve venture viability than either non (ß=0.130, p<0.01) or informal (ß=0.167, p<0.01) planners, although the comparison between planners and those that see planning as irrelevant is somewhat weaker (ß=0.082, p<0.1). All in all, the results are invariant to the composition of the control group: formal planners are more likely to achieve venture viability. Finally, to assess the robustness of these ATTs to unobserved heterogeneity, we calculated Rosenbaum bounds to check the sensitivity of our estimates. Table 8 shows that the results were insensitive to deviations from the unconfoundedness assumption, as large deviations (increasing the odds of formal planning and venture viability at the same time by more than 90 percent) would render the results insignificant 11 .
Finally, we consider potential differences between sample ATTs and population ATEs 12 . In Table 4 , the ATEs (expected mean difference in viability for an individual selected randomly from the sample) are similar to the baseline coefficients, with ATEs 10 One consequence of matching is that it reduces sample size (Guo and Fraser, 2014; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) . Hence, although we found matches for 70 percent of the initial formal planners , we also tested how the relaxation of the matching assumption affects the results and allow for 5 neighbours in the matching. This resulted in 243 planning and 657 non-planning observations. The ATT is smaller (ß=0.099, p<0.01) but within the bounds reported previously. 11 The bounds indicate that the confidence interval for the estimated treatment effects would widen (and include zero) if there are unobserved variables that can cause the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ between the treatment and comparison groups by the calculated values of the test statistic. 12 To estimate the ATEs, we used the same estimation strategy as was used for our core ATT results (Table 4) . Hence, we began by examining if there were differences in mean values and distributions between the matched and non-matched. There were slight differences in terms of mean values for seeking external financing (ß=0.14, KS p-value<0.01), start-up motivations (ß=0.26, KS p-value<0.01) and ability expectations (ß=0.18, KS pvalue<0.01). However, no other variables differed in means and there were no differences between planners and non-planners upon being matched. Distributional differences were also slight (full results available on request from authors), indicating that the wider population ATEs are reflected in the sample ATTs. Hence, we generally find that our sample is reflective of a random draw from the population and are subsequently confident that our sample average treatment effect also represents evidence on the population average treatment effect.
remaining significant (and economically sizeable) albeit one to three percentage points lower.
In Table 5 , ATEs again are highly significant but again some three percentage points lower on average for self-assessed viability, sustained viability and first sales, respectively. Each of these ATEs, however, remains significant. The ATEs in Table 6 show similar positive effects for the differing matching estimators while Table 7 shows for the different control group compositions slightly higher ATEs. Taken together, these corroborating ATEs provide further support for the ATT results.
In summary, our core ATT results (Table 4 ) -confirmed in subsequent robustness tests that examined an alternative dependent variable specification, controlled for right censoring biases, matching variants, the robustness of our treatment effects and in ATE estimates -shows support for the plan-venture viability relationship (H4b).
DISCUSSION
As the literature review highlighted, there persist divergent and contradictory interpretations of the role that formal plans play in achieving venture viability. The aim of this study was to offer fresh insights by developing and testing a counterfactual model of the plan-performance relationship. Our findings have important implications for scholars, educators, and aspiring founders interested in better understanding what shapes the decision to formally plan and the consequences of writing a formal plan.
Implications
For strategy and entrepreneurship scholars, our key finding is that it pays to plan. Our ATT results show a positive impact of planning on venture viability for those that actually planned that ranges from a lower bound of 10 to an upper bound of 15 percentage points. Similarly, our ATE estimates show that also a randomly chosen individual would have benefited from planning, though the effect is slightly (three percentage points) smaller. This is similar to other studies that examine plan-viability outcomes but do not adjust for endogeneity ( Overall, we see that the reason why plans promote venture viability is that they help to pierce the 'fog of futurity' (Kirzner, 2009 ) by identifying, orchestrating and promoting goal attainment (Locke and Latham, 1990; 2002) . We also see that formal plans are advantageous because they appear to promote better entrepreneurial decision making about the allocation and co-ordination of resources.
Such findings may offset the anti-planning bias in parts of the normative business plan literature which draws on emergent, improvisational logics to argue that founders are better off using trial-and-error learning to achieve viability. Theoretical approaches such as effectuation or bricolage have come to the fore because they suggest that emergent improvisational logics better support nascent venture outcomes. These logics have led to practitioner based approaches that suggest that nascent founders should eschew formal plans and focus on experimental learning (Schlesinger and Kiefer, 2012; Ries, 2011) . We recognize that these experimental logics are appealing because a central issue in nascent venturing is envisioning 'what is unknown, uncertain, and not yet obvious to the competition' (McGrath and MacMillan, 1995: 44) . While our study does not explicitly test these particular logics, we do note, however, that we separate out selection and performance effects, use appropriate longitudinal data, and conduct an extensive battery of tests. Counterfactual approaches such as ours, however, are largely absent from much of the improvisational business plan literature. This is surprising because logics such as effectuation and bricolage are predicated on how individual founders are able to leverage their personal resources for achieving venture outcomes. This endogeneity, however, is rarely examined in these studies. This presents a challenge to plan skeptics: before the efficacy of an emergent approach to creating a viable venture can be readily assessed, there is a need to disentangle the improvisational activities from the (experienced) improvisational actor.
Our current results, however, do not offer much succour to plan skeptics. Despite providing three variants of venture viability (self-assessed viability, sustained viability and achieved first sale), three different control group variations, and population based ATEs, our results all point to the value of formal plans. By implication, they also suggest that contingency based leveraging actions and experimentation appear to be more likely to lead to sub-optimal 'groping along' attempts to achieve venture viability (Dimov, 2010) . While, therefore, our findings tacitly question the utility of effectuation, bricolage and particular plan methodologies (e.g. lean start up or the business model canvas), we, however, stress that our results should not be over-interpreted. One reason for this is that founders rarely start with the simple stark question of: to plan or not to plan. Rather as Baum et al., (1998) suggests, they begin with a goal or a vision. One expression of this vision may be a formal business plan but, as Hmieleski and Corbett (2008) point out, this vision is likely to have to adapt to changing circumstances. Consequently, a formal plan may be valuable because it helps orchestrate improvisational activities and thereby improve entrepreneurial decision-making (Chwolka and Raith, 2012) .
One further contribution of this study is that we show that the founding environment plays an important role in specifying the boundary conditions around the decision to plan. In particular, by examining founder, venture and external characteristics, we join with Gruber (2007) Dencker et al., (2009a) and Burke et al., (2010) who all argue for a more nuanced interpretation of plan contexts and effects than is provided by guides that advocate that all ventures should either always plan or, alternatively, espouse the view that formal plans
should be avoided at all costs. Illustrative of this is the impact of finance. Our findings show that founders with private savings are less likely to plan, bolstering Bhide's (2000) suggestion that there is little impetus to plan when in there are few outside downside risks to venture creation. Our results also support Honig and Karlsson (2004) : the decision to plan is responsive to the need for external finance, indicating that plans are devices that help externally legitimate the nascent venture. However, our findings also show that formal plans are not just ceremonial cues because, once the need for external finance is controlled for, a formal written plan still has a positive impact on achieving venture viability.
Our study also has important implications for strategy scholars. It confirms that formal plans are valuable, even in innovative and growth-orientated contexts. It also shows the importance of developing an understanding of contextual environments that shape subsequent outcomes. Better understanding contexts is valuable because counterfactual models such as ours can help stimulate better theorizing about phenomena and improve the practical validity of results (Johns, 2006) . In seeking to discover context-free regularities, we see implications for other middle range situation-specific theorizing about entrepreneurial and managerial phenomena. In particular, our study resonates with other strategy based research that demonstrate that a failure to account for endogeneity leads to biased estimates (Shaver, 1998; Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999) . It also has implications for entrepreneurship research.
For example, taking account of endogeneity may provide new insights into how founders draw on their social capital to leverage venture outcomes. While some research highlights the generic benefits of social capital (Davidsson and Honig, 2003) , others point out that founder's social capital and their ability to form network ties is specifically shaped by their skills and occupational backgrounds (Mosey and Wright 2007; Stam 2010; Longest and Kim, 2014) . Similar selection effects are also likely to influence how founders use finance (Parker and Van Praag, 2006) , hire staff (Hayton, 2003) or conduct innovative activity (Redding, 1996) . Consequently, developing and testing counterfactual models can help develop a more contextualized perspective on entrepreneurial, managerial and organizational behaviors (Langley et al., 2013) .
This study has further practical implications for educators, financiers, support providers, and aspiring founders. In specific, both the sample ATTs and the wider population
ATEs results show that it pays to plan. This gives validation to the teaching of entrepreneurship through vehicles such as a formal business plan. It further gives support to the use of plans by start-up programmes and competitions, and external financiers to judge start-ups. For aspiring founders, our results clearly show that business plans help achieve venture viability but also that they have to carefully reflect on factors in their founding environment that impact on their decision to plan (Gruber, 2007) .
Limitations and future directions
Although our findings are robust to different versions of our main dependent variable, control groups, and sensitivity analyses including the appraisal of Rosenbaum bounds and population based ATEs, we cannot fully discount that our results are impacted by unobserved heterogeneity. Another limitation is that the PSED II measure of formal planning is crude. In this study, we have, as with the wider strategic and entrepreneurship literature, focused on plan formality. One downside of this is that it does not allow researchers, for example, to distinguish between a comprehensive plan that fully details the opportunity and a simple twopage document that provides an overview of the opportunity. Founders may recognize both of these as a business plan. The PSED II plan measures also do not allow us to focus on other dimensions to a plan such as its flexibility (Rudd et al., 2008; Capon et al., 1994) . Hence, there is a need for follow up PSED II style studies to consider the comprehensiveness, quality, and sophistication of the plans produced by nascent founders. One way of achieving this is to complement such data by collecting and independently analysing the planning materials of founders (including any associated activity and planning diaries) and by conducting in-depth periodic and regular interviews with founders. Equally, although the PSED II data allows us to control for differences between formal planners and other groups of planners, these more mixed methods approaches could allow researchers to examine how a plan is used to reflect, rehearse and provide feedback on reaching venture viability as well as investigating how founders draw together formal plans and use plans to counter cognitive biases such as over-optimism or an unwarranted escalation of commitment. One further extension of this research agenda could be to consider dimensions of plan participation by either by those around the founder or from external stakeholders. For example, although we find that business plans reflect finance requirements, we are unable to distinguish if this is due to external pressures from financiers seeking to distinguish between good and bad business propositions or if it reflects isomorphic pressures felt by the nascent founder to legitimate their venture (Honig and Karlsson, 2004) .
Conclusions
Understanding the context and outcomes of formal plans is clearly an important topic for scholars interested in offering insights and guidance to nascent founders on achieving venture viability. Much of the previous research has led to divergent appraisals of the value of formal plans because they have conflated selection with performance effects. Our contribution has been to develop and test a counterfactual model that explicitly disentangles what prompts the plan from its impact on new venture viability. This provides fresh insights into the contextual nature of the decision to plan. Notably, we found that founders were more likely to plan if they were seeking external finance, better educated, more innovative, and growth orientated.
The key advantage of our counterfactual approach, however, is that it uncovers, after a range of robustness checks, that founders are more likely to achieve viability if they formally plan.
Finding that it pays to plan is valuable because it helps to resolve the extant debate about the value of business plans and provides practical guidance on the utility of formal plans to nascent founders. 269 819 * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; coefficients in column 1 and 4 correspond to the marginal effects for the independent variables calculated at the mean levels of the remaining variables. Variables denoted with (d) are dummy variables. P-values are shown in parentheses. Colum 2 reports differences in mean values between the control group and the formal planners, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Column 3 reports p-values from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The number of observations is equal to 1,088 in all 4 columns. T-tests are carried out only for observations included in the binary regressions to allow for comparability. 
